1 Oct 2026 · Enric Massó · Politics & History
History Looks Inevitable Only After It Has Happened
Look at a modern map of Europe and everything seems surprisingly settled. Spain is Spain. France is France. Italy is Italy. Borders may have moved, kings may have changed and wars may have interrupted the story, but the countries…

Once we know the ending, we start reading everything before it as preparation. A dynastic marriage becomes the birth of a country. A defeated rebellion becomes a doomed rebellion. An institution that survived for centuries becomes a temporary obstacle because we know it eventually disappeared. What was uncertain to the people living through it becomes obvious to us.
Spain offers a particularly good example. The marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile is often used as a wonderfully convenient starting point. Two monarchs, two crowns, one marriage: Spain. It makes for a clean story. Political life remained considerably less clean.
Castile and the territories of the Crown of Aragon continued with different laws, institutions, fiscal systems and representative bodies. Their successors ruled territories that shared a monarch without becoming a modern unitary state overnight. Historians use terms such as “composite monarchy” precisely because the political structure was more complicated than the map we know today suggests. This does not prove that Spain was somehow unreal. It proves something less dramatic and more useful: the form Spain eventually took was not already finished.
We tend to erase the alternatives
The same problem appears whenever we tell history backwards. We see the winner and gradually turn every previous stage into part of the winner’s biography. But people in 1640, 1714 or 1812 did not know what Spain would look like in 2026. They were not actors in a documentary whose final episode they had already watched. They were defending institutions, privileges, interests, dynasties, political ideas and sometimes simply themselves, with incomplete information and fairly unreliable allies.
Some of the alternatives they defended would have been better. Some would have been worse. Most would have been a mixture, because history has an irritating habit of refusing to provide morally tidy options. The point is not to romanticise every political arrangement that disappeared. Local institutions were not automatically democratic. Old laws were not good merely because they were old. A composite monarchy was not a twenty-first-century federation wearing funny clothes.
What matters is that losing does not make an option unreal. That distinction changes how we read political conflict. If centralisation is treated as the natural direction of history, resistance to it becomes backward-looking almost by definition. If administrative uniformity is assumed to be synonymous with modernisation, institutions that stood in its way become quaint leftovers. And if current borders are treated as the starting point rather than the outcome, earlier arguments about sovereignty and political authority can look like regional disputes inside a state that did not yet exist in its present form.
None of that requires agreeing with the people who resisted those changes. It only requires allowing them to inhabit their own present rather than ours.
Maps are conclusions, not explanations
A modern political map is useful because it tells us where we are. It is less useful when we let it tell us how we got here. Countries are built through things that make national myths uncomfortable: marriages, wars, treaties, bargains, administrative reforms, economic interests, defeated projects, successful projects, accidents and decisions whose consequences were not obvious at the time. Later, once the arrangement has lasted long enough, much of that mess disappears from the story and the result begins to look natural.
Perhaps every country does this to some degree. It is difficult to build a shared national story around the message, “Things could quite easily have turned out differently.” Yet that may be one of the most useful ways to read history, because it restores something that hindsight removes: uncertainty.
When I started working on Apparently, We’re Spanish, I became interested in what would happen if the history of Spain were approached without using today’s Spain as the automatic starting assumption. Not to prove that another outcome was destined to happen, but to see the present as one historical outcome among several possible ones.
That change in perspective does not tell anyone what to think about Spain, Catalonia or independence. It does something I find more interesting: it makes the familiar map slightly less obvious. And once a map stops looking inevitable, better questions begin to appear about how it was made.
Related book
Apparently, We’re Spanish A History of Spain from the Other Side
Spain has a history. Catalonia has lived through it. This book retraces five centuries of Spanish history from a Catalan perspective, exploring how Spain was built, how Catalonia became part of it, and why that relationship remains contested.
Available on Amazon → [link pending]
